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Vol. 11, #6 July 27, 2000
MEALEY'S LITIGATION
REPORT:
Reinsurance
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© Copyright 2000 Mealey Publications, Inc., King of
Prussia, PA 18
Commentary
Insurance
Insolvencies: The Reinsurer’s View
By
Jack Cuff
[Editor’s Note: Mr. Cuff is with the New York office
of Ernst & Young and has previously worked in the General Re claim
department and was Vice President of Claims for the U.S. branch
office of Munich Re. This article does not necessarily represent the
opinions of Ernst & Young or its clients. Copyright 2000 by the
author. Replies to this commentary are welcome.]
Introduction
(The numbers in
the text refer to the endnotes.)
The relationship between a reinsurer and a cedant is
meant to be a mutually beneficial partnership. It is characterized
by a high degree of trust and good faith dealings. But when the
reinsured company gets into financial difficulty and ultimately
fails, that relationship can change overnight. The bond is loosened;
the benefits are no longer mutual; and, the level of trust between
the parties often declines.
For most of those involved with the insolvent
reinsured — its policyholders, employees,investors, brokers,
officers and directors — the failure of the company is an
unmitigated calamity quite apart from any changing relationship with
the company’s reinsurers.
Coverages, jobs, investments and careers are lost.
To those directly involved with the sinking enterprise, whether the
company has a strong relationship with or can recover from its
reinsurers is of secondary importance, and best left to the
appropriate regulator to address.
For the reinsurer of the insolvent, on the other
hand, the significant change in the relationship can be a mixed
blessing. No reinsurer deliberately begins a relationship with a
cedant that is clearly headed towards liquidation. But the failure
of the ceding company can surprisingly bring some financial benefits
as well as the expected headaches.
In the following section, we discuss the storm
clouds that gather over the reinsurer when its cedant fails. Later,
some unexpected silver linings are pointed out.
The Storm Clouds Gather
Once the ceding company is declared insolvent and a
receiver for the estate is named, the company is transformed. It has
changed from an ongoing insurance enterprise to a ghost of its
former self, under state supervision with the receiver standing in
the shoes of the insolvent.
To the reinsurer, the cedant isn’t the same cedant
anymore. Before insolvency, it investigated and mitigated
policyholder claims; now that it has become insolvent, it is
sometimes perceived as searching for claims.1 Before the cedant
asked for money only when it actually paid a claim; now it asks for
reimbursement even though it has not actually paid anything.2 Once
the cedant tried to commercially resolve disputes with its
reinsurers informally; now litigation and arbitration are
commonplace.3 Previously, the cedant protected the reinsurer from
excessive financial shocks4; nowadays it tries to engineer a
commutation of the entire reinsurance contract.5 Formerly, the
cedant would not draw down on a letter of credit; now it may
threaten to do so.6 Previously, the companies could set off losses
against premium; that has changed — the insolvent may now want to
hold on any premium for as long as possible but have the reinsurer
pay all losses as well. To sum up, before insolvency the cedant was
a business partner of the reinsurer; now it is a cash flow drain and
a burdensome administrative strain.
There are other drawbacks for the reinsurer.
Valuable resources, such as time, staff, office space and money for
travel costs, are devoted to winding down obligations under the
terminated reinsurance contracts. These resources would otherwise be
better used for working with continuing
profitable
active cedants. Trust and agreement
between the parties is often at low ebb, so more expenses are
incurred to monitor claim handling and litigate or arbitrate
disputes.
Reserves stay on the reinsurer’s books longer
because of inherent delays and uncertainty and because the
liquidator needs more time to get organized. There is also a danger
of damaging the reinsurer’s reputation as a dependable, promptly
paying partner because of the increasingly public and antagonistic
disputes with the insolvent reinsured.7 In short, the environment is
less predictable and more hostile for the reinsurer.
Involvement with a failed ceding company leads the
reinsurer from the familiar world of private enterprise to the alien
environment of government regulation, politics, and close public
scrutiny, where all the rules seem to be turned on their head. With
normal cedant/reinsurer relationships, the goal of both parties is
to have a longstanding mutually profitable relationship. With
insolvency, the goals diverge. The receiver is seeking generally to
(1) fix the estate’s liabilities; (2) marshal its assets; and,(3)
wind down the estate as promptly but as fairly as possible. The
reinsurer, on the other hand, is trying to become disentangled from
the estate with the least damage in losses and expense costs.
The Reinsurer’s Silver Lining-Paying Less And Paying
It Later
For the reinsurer, there can be a brighter side:
lower settlements and delayed payments.
These often are the advantages of a cedant’s
failure. For many insolvencies, especially those with long tail
exposures, it is certain the reinsurer would have paid more money
more quickly if the company had survived. The ceding company’s
failure generally throws a monkey wrench into the process, creating
confusion and discouraging claimants from filing their claims in the
first place or at least dampening their enthusiasm to pursue their
claim.
Lower Payments .
Policyholder settlements with receivers are often lower than they
would have been on an identical claim with a solvent company.
Reinsurers, of course, benefit from this phenomenon. Here are some
of the reasons:
• Liquidations impose claim bar dates — in most
states, 18 months or less after liquidation unless specially
extended. Policyholders with long tail claims can find their claims
have been barred before they were even asserted. When extensions are
available, discouraged claimants don’t always apply for them.
• Even if they get past the bar date problem,
insureds are not familiar with the protracted insolvency process and
are, therefore, not as diligent or effective during the negotiations
in maximizing their recovery and protecting their interests. Also,
they may not invest sufficient time and effort to maximize their
recoveries because they are doubtful they will ever recover much
from the insolvency;
• Many large insureds abandon or ignore their claims
against the estate completely, believing they would be throwing good
money after bad in pursuing a small recovery in the insolvency
court;
• Guarantee funds and receivers can play hardball in
the negotiations with the policyholder, knowing threats of a bad
faith claim are remote;
• In environmental and toxic tort claims, which can
trigger many policies, policyholders ordinarily seek first to
maximize recoveries from all solvent carriers and later seek
discounted reimbursements from insolvents; and,
• In environmental and toxic tort claims,
liquidators are not involved in costly coverage and defense
litigation. Once it has been declared insolvent, all actions against
the liquidated company are ordinarily stayed.8 The cost of this
litigation can be quite considerable.
This is not a one-way street though. There can be
instances where the insolvency itself may increase the amount of the
reinsurer’s claims payments. For example, solvent insurers can at
times resolve long-tail claims for less than the ultimate loss
exposure by settling with the insured on a present value basis. The
reinsurer may benefit from this lower settlement.9 Policyholders are
generally not willing to give any credit for the present value of
money in negotiations with the insolvent since it will not pay the
insured any part of a settled allowance until a court approved
distribution from the estate is made (which can be many years in the
future.) The reinsurer in this case may pay more on an identical
loss because of the insolvency.
The reinsurer of an insolvent may also pay a higher
amount more quickly, if the receiver estimates the ultimate value of
the claims against the estate and demands immediate payment on these
estimates from the reinsurer. Some states have provisions in their
statutes that allow the receiver to do this.10 The proposed Uniform
Receivership Law (URL) also has a claim estimation provision with
some limitations allowing what amounts to an arbitrated forced
commutation.11 Reinsurers contend that these estimates can be
unreliable and often are too high.12 They also argue that
accelerating reinsurance recoveriesbreaches the fundamental terms of
the agreement with the ceding company. On the other hand, claim
estimation based on projections of past experience may understate
the cost of late-developing claims. By “cutting off the tail” of
long term liability policies,estimation may save reinsurers
significant sums.
Delayed Payments.
Liquidation slows the entire claim
evaluation and disposition process, frequently to a crawl, sometimes
to what appears to be a standstill. There are instances of insurers
taken over by receivers in the 1970’s, which are not yet, in the new
millennium, finalized.13 Reinsurers may benefit when the day of
reckoning is postponed (or never reached.) The interest that a
reinsurer can earn on years of postponed reimbursements can be
significant.
Several factors, unique to the insolvency of the
company, impede the flow of money from the reinsurer to the cedant
to the policyholder to the claimant. Here are some of the common
ones:
• Many years can be spent just locating and
organizing the records of the failed insurer. Insolvents’ accounts
are often found by the receiver to be disordered, incomplete, kept
in diverse places, or difficult to decipher. Disorganized records
are often the reason why the company got into trouble in the first
place, or else a consequence of the chaos that preceded its failure.
With many of the original employees quickly leaving the insolvent,
the receiver has a difficult time finding and reconstructing basic
information, including insurance policies and reinsurance contracts.
• Unless appropriate financial and employment
incentives are put in place, the receiver’s staff can slow the
process, consciously or not. Faced with the prospect of losing their
jobs once the estate is finalized, they may not be in a hurry to
speed things along. They deserve to be given a financial or other
good reason why a swift winding down of the estate is in their best
professional and personal interest. Many estates have done this, but
others have not.
• Policyholders often drag their heels in submitting
timely and complete information to the receiver. Ordinarily, they
are not acquainted with the receivership claim process, which
includes completing a proof of claim and cooperating with the
liquidator. They lose time just understanding what they must do to
recover. Often may they become active only when they learn that the
estate is going to pay an interim dividend or that the bar date is
imminent.
• Reinsurers cause delays by scrutinizing
settlements and coverage decisions more closely. Since the insolvent
is no longer a business partner, the reinsurer is less likely to be
overly accommodating, or to view a questionable claim with
magnanimity.
• In the case of latent injury claims, which often
trigger numerous policies, insureds usually first seek recovery from
solvent carriers. Afterward, sometimes many years later, they may
actively pursue their claim against the receivership, if they are
not time barred. As the reinsurer of a very unprofitable insurance
company it is, in some ways, a stroke of luck and good fortune that
the cedant is declared insolvent. For the reinsurer, the ceding
company’s insolvency tends to diminish the damaging effects of
unprofitable underwriting.
Conclusion
The reinsurer’s difficulties with an insolvent
cedant are well documented and easily understood. The benefits,
meager as they sometimes are, can be overlooked or discounted. The
reinsurer needs to accept the new, sometimes harsh, realities
stemming from the insolvency of a cedant and develop a pragmatic and
cost-effective exit plan. Understanding why things are suddenly
turned on their head is the first step towards these goals. The
second step is to meet all obligations under the reinsurance
contracts in this challenging new environment so that the situation
does not go from bad to worse.
Developing a close and supportive working
relationship with the receiver’s claims operation will ensure that
defendable claims are skillfully handled. Communicating and
cooperating in general with the receiver makes good business sense.
ENDNOTES
1. See, for example, in Missouri § 375.1208 R.S.Mo
3: “At any time the liquidator may request the claimant to present
information or evidence supplementary to that required under
subsection 1 of this section and may take testimony under oath,
require production of affidavits or depositions, or otherwise obtain
additional information or evidence.” Reinsurers sometimes grumble
that liquidators are too exuberant in encouraging claimants to
pursue their claims in the receivership.
2. Most reinsurance contracts are indemnification
agreements requiring the reinsurer to reimburse the cedant only for
the amount of losses actually paid. Since the estate does not pay
policyholders immediately for allowances, reinsurers may believe
that they are not required to make a reimbursement until actual
payment is made. The insolvency clause, contained in nearly all US
reinsurance contracts, requires the reinsurer to pay the liquidator
without diminution because of the insolvency. See NY Insurance Law
Section 1308(a)(2).
3. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706
(1996); Corcoran v. Andra, 77 N.Y.2d 225; 567 N.E.2d 969 (1990).
4. If they lose money in a contract year, reinsurers
traditionally expect to be made whole by the cedant in the following
years. Cedants also protect their treaty reinsurers by buying
specific (i.e. facultative) reinsurance protection for a
particularly volatile risk that would otherwise fall under the
treaty contract.
5. In Quackenbush v. Mission
Insurance
Co, 46 Cal. App. 4th 458, 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d 112 (1996), the California Court of Appeal upheld objections of
reinsurers and the Reinsurance Association of America (RAA) to a
plan by which the California
Insurance Commissioner
proposed to wind up the Mission estate through the estimation of
outstanding claims and incurred but not reported (IBNR) losses.
However, in Quackenbush v Mission Ins. Co. (1998,2nd Dist) 62 Cal
App 4th 797, 73 Cal Rptr 2d 95 the court approved an amended plan
which expressly prohibited the Commissioner from requiring payment
of incurred but not reported loss amounts from reinsurers until
their liability for and the amounts of such losses were determined.
See Angoff v. Holland-America Insurance. Court of Appeals Missouri,
Western District 937 S.W.2d 213; (1996) where the court found no
objections to collection of IBNR estimates from the reinsurers. 6.
See, Robert Hall, Drawing Down Letters of Credit in an Insurer
Receivership Context. 11
Mealey’s Lit. Rep.: Ins. Insolvency
21 (April 6, 2000).
7. This may be the greatest loss of all. A reinsurer
lives or dies by its reputation as a longterm dependable partner of
the cedant. An important element of its good name is the ability and
willingness to pay claims promptly. A negative report involving a
claim dispute with an insolvency can damage its image.
8. For example see 215 ILCS 5/189 ”. . . The court
may also restrain all persons, companies, and entities from bringing
or further prosecuting all actions and proceedings at law or in
equity or otherwise, whether in this State or elsewhere, against the
company or its assets or property or the Director except insofar as
those actions or proceedings arise in or are brought in the
conservation, rehabilitation, or liquidation proceeding.”
9. The reinsurer may not benefit. The cedant could
argue that its present value settlement should be shared with the
reinsurer in the same ratio that the ultimate loss would have been
shared in the absence of the settlement.
10. See for example in Illinois 215 ILCS 5/209(7);
and in New Jersey see 8 Mealeys
Lit. Rep.: Ins. Insolvency
13, at 4 (Dec. 2, 1996). Also see Note 5 above.
11. See Hall. Estimation of Claims and Acceleration
of Reinsurance recoverables: The Uniform Receivership Law.
10 Mealey’s Insolv. Rep.
No. 17 at 16 (1999).
12. For a discussion of the prominent issues in
claim estimations see Veed, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Long Tail
Claims in Insurance Insolvencies. 34 Tort and Insurance Law Journal,
No. 1, p. 167 (Fall 1998).
13. For example, Signal and Imperial in California
were placed in liquidation in 1978. American Reserve in Illinois
went into liquidation in 1979. These estates are still open.
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